EU military and civilian crisis management operations: the first six years

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Introduction

The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was established at the 1999 Cologne European Council summit. Four years later the EU embarked on its first operation – the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM). To date, the EU has launched both military and civilian crisis management operations, such as police, border control, rule-of-law training and peace-monitoring missions. This policy brief will give a short description of each ESDP operation and then, if possible, analyse whether the operation succeeded and why the EU became involved in the country. In this brief, the missions are grouped in geographical zones: Europe (Western Balkans, South Caucasus and Moldova / Ukraine), and Asia (South East Asia, Asia and Middle East) and Africa (East, West and Central Africa).

Western Balkans

EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM):

The EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) launched on 1 January 2003 was initially mandated for a period of three years. Following an invitation by the Bosnian authorities in January 2006, the EU decided to pursue a follow-on police mission with a modified mandate and size for another two years. At the end of 2007 the mission was again extended until December 2009.

When in 2003 EUPM took over from the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF), which had been established in 1995 after the Bosnian war to supervise Bosnia's police, EUPM planners believed that in general Bosnia had achieved basic democratic standards of policing. The focus of assistance should therefore shift to the enhancement of the capacity and management of Bosnia's police service. The EU deployed 500 police experts who were co-located at medium and senior level of the Bosnian police and tasked to 'monitor, mentor and advise in all aspects of police work.'

Officially, the EU claimed a number of successes achieved during the first phase of EUPM (January 2003 – January 2006) such as the transformation of the State Investigation and Protection Agency into an operational police agency with
enhanced executive powers to fight organised crime and the solid development of other state-level institutions, in particular the Ministry of Security and the border police. However, critics, notably the well-known NGO 'International Crisis Group', arrive at a far more negative conclusion when assessing the first phase of EUPM. According to them, EUPM’s mandate was too weak. Bosnia was still in need of substantive police reforms. EUPM, however, did not have the power to initiate any reform measures. The mission also suffered from disputes over competence between the Police Commissioner and the Special Representative.

EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation Althea):
Following the decision by NATO to conclude its Stabilisation Force Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR) and the UN authorisation of the deployment of an EU force to take over SFOR, the EU decided to launch military operation Althea on 2 December 2004. On 19 November 2007, the EU agreed to retain a military presence in the country for as long as necessary as part of its overall engagement in Bosnia.

Like SFOR, Althea was mandated in the first phase of the operation (December 2004 – December 2006) to maintain a safe and secure environment and ensure continued compliance with the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement, which put an end to the Bosnian war. Althea’s main focus quickly became the fight against crime. In order to tackle crime, the EU used the Integrated Police Union (IPU), which had previously worked for SFOR.

With the deployment of 7000 troops, Althea has been the EU’s most robust military mission to date. The mission has been carried out under a NATO–EU agreement – the ‘Berlin Plus’ agreement. This agreement, which was adopted at the 1999 Washington NATO summit but only implemented in March 2003 after controversy between Greece and Turkey, allows the EU to make use of NATO’s military assets in its own operations. Althea has been on balance a success. The operation has allowed the EU to experiment with large-scale helicopter manoeuvres, organise the voluntary surrender of small arms and undertake peace support training schemes. However, in the first phase of Althea the Integrated Police Unit caused problems. Its robust approach to the fight against organised crime often clashed with the work of the EU’s simultaneous Police Mission in Bosnia (see above). There was a lack of coordination between Althea and EUPM partly due to the fact that the two missions responded to different persons on the ground and in Brussels. Coordination between the two missions somewhat improved at the end of 2005 when the Council decided to set up regular meetings between the persons involved in EUPM and Althea.

EU Military Operation in former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Operation Concordia):
When in February 1999 the UN peacekeeping force withdrew from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia after seven years of deployment, in which the UN successfully prevented a spill-over from the Bosnian war into Macedonia, the country appeared to have attained a degree of stability. Yet, the Kosovo conflict and the large numbers of Albanian refugees escaping to Macedonia threatened to weaken the country’s fragile ethnic modus vivendi between Macedonians and Albanians. Many Albanians felt concerned by their inadequate representation in state institutions, particularly the police, whereas Macedonians feared that the grievances of the Albanian community masked a separatist agenda. As the tensions between Macedonians and Albanians rose to the surface and the country stood on the brink of a civil war, the international community, notably NATO and the EU, intervened. On 13 August 2001, the so called Ohrid Agreement was signed guaranteeing the equal representation of Albanians within state institutions. In return, the Agreement called for the disbanding of the armed wing of the Albanian rebels, the UCK, and their disarmament. NATO was named as the international organisation tasked with initially overseeing the disarmament operation.

On 31 March 2003, the EU took over from NATO in Macedonia. Operation Concordia involved 375 troops from all EU states except Ireland and Denmark and from 14 additional states and was the EU’s first military operation. In July 2003, Concordia was extended for three months and concluded as planned on 15 December 2003. The core aim of Concordia was to contribute to a secure environment and to allow for the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement. The operation made use of NATO assets and capabilities, as foreseen in the ‘Berlin Plus’ agreement.

Concordia succeeded in helping keep the peace between Albanian rebels and the Macedonian army. The mission was political symbolic as it was deployed at the height of the Iraq war, but modest in military terms. It quickly became clear that the biggest problem in Macedonia was no longer armed conflict but criminality. Controversy had arisen in the run-up to the deployment of Concordia both as result of the Greek–Turkish dispute over the ‘Berlin Plus’ agreement, which held up the implementation of the agreement, and France’s desire nevertheless to go ahead with the launch of Concordia without the agreement. From an operational point, the EU could have deployed Concordia without recourse to NATO assets. However, in the midst of the transatlantic disunity over Iraq, most member states were against such a step. In the end, the start of Concordia was delayed until ‘Berlin Plus’ was finally concluded on 17 March 2003.

EU Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Operation Proxima):
Concordia was succeeded on 15 December 2003 by the EU Police Operation Proxima, which was completed on 14 December 2005. In the first phase of the mission (December 2003 – June 2004), the 200 EU police officers and civilian experts were co-located in the Ministry of Interior and police stations in the former crisis areas to ‘mentor, monitor and advise’ police officers.2 In addition, a team of EU border police officers was deployed at the border crossing points and the
international airports of Skopje and Ohrid. In the last phase of the mission (July 2004 – December 2005), the geographical coverage of Proxima was expanded to a country-wide deployment, although a higher presence in the former crisis areas was retained. Proxima was confronted with numerous constraints, some of which were beyond its control. The fact that the mission was the last to arrive to an already very crowded scene of international actors with competing mandates resulted in the constant questioning of Proxima’s presence and mission. Furthermore, the division of roles between Proxima’s Police Commissioner, the Special Representative and the European Commission Delegation was unclear. Battles over competence were fought especially between the Special Representative and the Commission Delegation. The lack of coordination and the strained relationship between the EU institutions not only compromised Proxima’s work, but were also detrimental to the EU’s image in Macedonia. The November 2005 Council decision to replace in Macedonia the Head of the Commission Delegation and the Special Representative with a single ‘double-hatted’ EU representative did however improve the situation.

**EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo):**

On 16 February 2008, one day before the Kosovo’s parliament endorsed a declaration of independence from Serbia, the EU Council decided to launch ‘EULEX Kosovo’ – a European Union Rule-of-Law Mission in Kosovo. The mandate for EULEX, the EU’s largest civilian crisis management mission to date, is for two years but it is intended to terminate the mission when Kosovo authorities have gained enough experience to guarantee that all members of society benefit from the rule of law. EULEX is tasked to support, mentor, monitor and advise the local authorities on all areas related to the establishment of the rule of law. The initial objective was for EULEX to become fully operational after a transition period foreseen to end in December 2008. Until then, the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which had been established in June 1999 to provide Kosovo with a transitional administration, was to continue to exercise its executive authority. Yet following Serbia’s refusal to deal with EULEX, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon proposed in November 2008 a six-point compromise plan that would clear the way for the EU mission. The plan envisaged an autonomous police force for Serb-majority areas, which would receive directives from the UN’s mission in Kosovo; with EULEX responsible for policing structures in majority-Albanian areas. Furthermore, the EU mission should remain officially neutral on the question of Kosovo’s independent status. The Kosovo government initially rejected the plan as it saw it as a violation of its constitution and a de-facto partition of the state. However, after the US urged Kosovo to back the plan, a consensus was reached at the UN Security Council meeting on 26 November 2008. The six-point plan was accepted by Kosovo and Serbia gave the green light for deployment of EULEX in the whole territory of Kosovo. On 9 November 2008 the EU began deploying its troops to Kosovo.

**The EU in the Balkans: Summary:**

The motive behind the ESDP missions in the Balkans can best be described as an attempt by the EU to restore its credibility in the region. When conflicts escalated in the Western Balkans in the early 1990s, the EU member states lacked military capability to contain the conflicts. Indeed, Europe’s military impotence and dependence on the US in this matter served as a catalyst for bringing the EU member states together in 1999 to establish a European Security and Defence Policy. 4 years later the EU was eager to show that with ESDP it had now the capability to stabilise its own neighbourhood.

In general, the EU has made significant progress towards its objective of becoming a serious power in the Balkans although with its first operation in the Balkans, the EU Police Mission in Bosnia, the EU underestimated the size as well as the complexity of the task. Althea, by contrast, has been a successful and robust military operation, as was the smaller military mission Concordia.

The EU’s latest mission in the Balkans, the Rule-of-Law Mission in the Kosovo, can play an important role in improving political and legal rights in Kosovo after being given the go-ahead in December 2008 to take over the running of courts and to support Kosovo police. However, EULEX still faces acute problems. Its formal ability to operate in the Serb enclaves had been in doubt for most of 2008, and it remains to be seen how it will deal with ethnic divisions on the ground.

**South Caucasus**

**EU Rule of Law Mission in Georgia (EUJUST Themis):**

Following the 2003 ‘Rose Revolution’ in Georgia, in June 2004 the EU set up a rule-of-law operation, the EUJUST Themis operation. The mission was concluded on 14 July 2005. The role of Themis was to guide Georgia’s reform process for all relevant stakeholders in the criminal justice sector. In doing so, the mission complemented to a certain degree ongoing Union-funded programmes in Georgia, such as projects for penitentiary and probation service reform, organisational reform of the Ministry of Justice and parliamentary and electoral reform. Themis consisted of 10 legal experts who were co-located in Georgian institutions.

Themis suffered a number of problems, such as lack of reliable phone and fax lines and the absence of internet service. A more severe problem was that Georgian policy-makers were also advised by experts form the US Department for Justice who offered a different legal philosophy to that offered by the EU experts. In general, the Themis mandate was too ambitious for a one year mission. Georgia’s reform of the criminal justice sector was far from concluded when the EU withdrew its experts from Georgia. The conduct of EUJUST Themis could have been more effective if relations between Themis and the European Commission Delegation had not been strained.
Operation Proxima, inter-institutional and individual tensions between Themis' Head of Mission and the Commission Delegation undermined coordination of EU policy.

EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM):
After the pro-Western Mikhail Saakashvile succeeded Eduard Shevardnadze as Georgian President in the 'Rose Revolution' and pledged to recover (by force if necessary) South Ossetia and Abkhazia – two regions which broke away from Georgia in the early 1990s and since then were supported by Russia – tensions between Georgia and the two regions began to escalate. In the summer of 2008, a series of clashes between Georgian and South Ossetian forces prompted Georgia to launch an aerial bombardment and ground attack on South Ossetia on 7th August. Russia reacted to the attack on its ally South Ossetia by launching bombing raids on targets in Georgia. On 12th August French President, Nicholas Sarkozy, brokered on behalf of the EU a ceasefire between Georgia and Russia/South Ossetia. In accordance with this ceasefire agreement the EU established on 15th September 2008 a civilian monitoring mission in Georgia with a one-year mandate. Two weeks later the EU deployed its monitors to Georgia.

The 200 unarmed monitors are tasked to supervise the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, including the withdrawal of Russian and Georgian armed forces to the positions held prior to the outbreak of hostilities. They should also contribute to the stabilisation and normalisation of the situation in the areas affected by the conflict. This however has proved difficult as Russia has refused to allow the EU monitors to access the breakaway regions, South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

In January 2009, the EU Head of Mission and the Georgian Defence Minister signed a Memorandum of Understanding stipulating certain restrictions to the movements of the Georgian armed forces in the vicinity of the administrative boundary lines of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The EU hopes that this arrangement will persuade Russia to move as well and facilitate the work of the EU monitors.

The EU and the former USSR: Summary:
Both Georgia missions have represented a test for EU relations with Russia. Themis was not only the first ESDP operation in the former Soviet Union but was seen by Russia as a signal of political support to the pro-Western Georgian leadership after the 'Rose Revolution'. The modest mandate of Themis, however, persuaded Russia to repress its concerns.

When the monitoring mission was launched, the relationship between Russia and the West was at its lowest point since the end of the Cold War. In December 2008, the OSCE military monitoring mission in Georgia had to end its mission because Russia's envoy to the organisation refused to agree to extend the Georgia mission, unless the 55 other members agreed that South Ossetia and Abkhazia were independent countries. Although Russia has no direct role in the EU mission, as long as it does not implement its commitments under the ceasefire agreement, including the opening of South Ossetia and Abkhazia for EU monitors, it remains difficult for the EU to fulfil its mandate.

EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine:
At the joint request of the Presidents of Ukraine and Moldova the EU set up a border assistance mission on the Ukrainian-Moldovan border on 30th November 2005. In 2007, the mandate has been extended up to November 2009.

The Ukrainian-Moldovan border is sensitive in that it includes the Russian-backed separatist Transnistrian region of Moldova. Transnistria, which declared independence from Moldova in 1992, has long been a haven for smugglers and arms dealers. The EU Border Mission is mandated to help improve the capacity of the Moldovan and Ukrainian border and customs services to prevent and detect smuggling, trafficking of goods and human beings, and customs fraud. In order to deliver on the mandate, EU experts provide on-the-job training and advice to Moldovan and Ukrainian officials. The mission initially included 70 experts seconded from 16 EU member states. In May 2006, it was decided to step up the intensity of border controls and increase the EU personnel to 108.

The work of the mission has resulted in an improved security situation along the border, enhanced professional capacity of Moldovan and Ukrainian border and customs officials and stronger interagency and cross border cooperation.

The launch of the border assistance mission to Moldova and Ukraine was decided in the light of the planned 2007 accession of Romania to the EU. The fact that Moldova would become an EU border state after Romania's EU accession created pressure on the EU to stabilise Moldova and in particular its sensitive border to Ukraine.

South-East Asia
Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM):
On 15th September 2005, the EU launched its most distant mission so far, the Aceh Monitoring Mission. The mission was initially mandated for a six month stay. In May 2006 the EU agreed to Indonesia's request to continue the mandate until the local elections in Aceh. The mission was accordingly prolonged until the end of December 2006.

The AMM's remit was to oversee the peace agreement between the government of Indonesia and Free Aceh Movement which on 15th August 2005 put an end to thirty years of civil war. The peace talks were facilitated by several elements: the humanitarian emergency and increased international attention following the Tsunami disaster of December 2004, the favourable domestic political conjuncture (militarily weak rebels and newly elected government) and the excellent handling of the peace talks by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari. At the end
of the talks, the question of monitoring the peace agreement came to the forefront. Because of the UN’s support for East Timor’s independence from Indonesia in 2001 a deployment of UN troops was unacceptable for Indonesia. The EU in partnership with the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was therefore asked to assume the task.

The Aceh Monitoring Mission comprised 130 EU monitors supported by 96 more from five ASEAN member states (Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) who operated jointly in mixed teams. Besides monitoring the peace agreement, the mission also included decommissioning and destruction of weapons.

Apart from such administrative deficiencies as the lack of logistic support, the mission was in other respects a success. Coordination and cooperation among EU institutions and bodies worked well on the ground and the EU set up the mission in the space of six weeks over the summer period, even though at first the member states had not considered the mission a priority. Their subsequent willingness to become involved in Aceh had a number of grounds. The Aceh mission was a practical way of demonstrating that the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by French and Dutch voters did not spell the end of ESDP. The mission matched the vision of those EU countries, in particular France, which wanted the EU to become a global power. Finally, it rapidly become clear to all outside observers that the absence of credible monitors would lead to a breakdown of the peace agreement and the resumption of hostilities.

**Asia**

**EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan):**

Following a generally viewed as unsuccessful training programme of the Afghan police led by Germany until 2006, the EU agreed to assume control of the training of the Afghan police. On 15 June 2007 EUPOL Afghanistan was set up with a mandate to last three years. The aim of the mission was to contribute to the establishment of sustainable and effective civil policing arrangements that will ensure appropriate interaction with the wider criminal justice system under Afghan ownership. In pursuit of this ambitious goal, however, the 270 police, law enforcement and justice experts stationed at central, regional and provincial levels are only allowed to monitor, mentor, advice and train the Afghan police. Like Germany, the EU has made the mistake of trying to work with the existing faulty police structures. Moreover, the number of EU personnel deployed to Afghanistan is too small to be effective. The EU deployed ten times the personnel to its operation in Kosovo — a province one sixtieth the size of Afghanistan.

**Middle-East**

**EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point (EU BAM RAFAH) / EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPS):**

The EU is currently conducting two operations in Palestine — Border Assistance Mission EU BAM RAFAH and Police Mission EUPOL COPS.

**EU B AMP Rafah was inaugurated on 30 November 2005 to monitor the Rafah border crossing point between Gaza and Egypt. The mission is intended to contribute to building up the Palestinian capacity in all aspects of border management as well as liaison between the Palestinian, Israeli and Egyptian authorities.** However, with Hamas’ victory in the Palestinian election in January 2006 and the onset of military exchanges in Gaza, the Rafah crossing point has only irregularly been opened — the last time on 9 June 2007. Since then, the mission has remained on standby. Nevertheless on 10th November 2008, the EU decided to extend the mandate of the EUBAM Rafah Mission until 24th November 2009.

**EUPOL COPS was established on 14 November 2005 to provide enhanced support to the Palestinian Authority in establishing sustainable and effective policing.** The mission, comprising 33 unarmed EU police officers and 15 Palestinians, is designed to assist the Palestinian Authority in the implementation of a civil police development plan as well as to coordinate financial assistance from EU countries and other international donors to the Palestinian civil police. Recently, the EU announced the extension of EUPOL COPS’ initial three-year mandate until 31st December 2010, although following the Palestinian election and the outburst of violence in Palestine, it has become increasingly difficult for the EU to carry on with its mission.

**EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST Lex):**

On 1 July 2005, the EU started a rule of law mission in Iraq, the so called EUJUST Lex mission, which will continue until June 2009. EUJUST Lex consists of integrated training in management and criminal investigation for high and middle-ranking Iraqi officials from the judiciary, the police and the prison service in order to help promote an integrated criminal justice system in Iraq. In contrast to other similar EU operations, EUJUST LEX organises its training activities inside the EU and not in the host country. There is only a small liaison team in Baghdad.

**Summary:**

The three ESDP missions in the Middle East are primarily of symbolic importance, stressing the European Union’s interest in the area. Although the two Palestinian operations aim at building confidence and trust between the Palestinian and Israeli government, the effectiveness of EU BAM RAFAH and EUPOL COPS has to be questioned, given their small sizes and the fact that they have been largely on standby for the last two years. EUJUST Lex has been hailed a success by the EU. Yet, the mission is too small to be really effective and it is regrettable, even if wholly understandable, that the training of the Iraqi officials needs to be carried out inside the EU.
To date major Middle East operations with European involvement have not been taking place under ESDP. If there is a need for a military or civilian crisis management mission in the Middle East, as, for example, was the case after the July/August 2006 Lebanon crisis, individual nation states or the UN have been taking the lead. When European troops were considered vital for the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), there was no intention by the EU member states to deploy an ESDP mission to Lebanon.

East Africa

EU Military Coordination of Action against Piracy in Somalia (EU NAVCO):

On 15th September 2008, the EU launched a military coordination action in Somalia (EU NAVCO) ‘to support surveillance and protection operations led by certain member states off the Somali coast’. This mission was set up following the rise in the number of hijacked ships in the Gulf of Aden during the last year, which transformed this important sea route into the most unsafe and dangerous maritime route in the world. On 8th December 2008 the activities of EU NAVCO were transferred to an EU naval military operation called Operation Atalanta. Atalanta planned for a period of 12 months should contribute to the protection of both vulnerable vessels cruising off the Somali coast and vessels of the ‘World Food Programme’ delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia. The up to 1,200 people taking part in the operation can arrest, detain and transfer persons who have committed acts of piracy or armed robbery.

West Africa

EU mission in Support of Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau (EU SSR Guinea-Bissau):

In April 2008, Guinea-Bissau became host to the EU's most recent security sector reform mission, which will last until 15 September 2009. EU SSR Guinea-Bissau is mandated ‘to provide advice and assistance on reform of the security sector in Guinea Bissau’ in order to create the conditions for implementing a national security sector reform strategy. Police units, the army, air force, navy and judiciary, are to be reformed as part of the ambitious government exercise. EU SSR Guinea-Bissau comprising 15 military and civilian advisors is designed to fit in with the activities under the European Commission's Instrument for Stability and the European Development Fund, as well as member states’ efforts.

In order for the mission to be successful, it will have to deal with a number of obstacles including a weak civil society, a drug-trafficking problem, and strong military institutions. Recent political instability, including the dissolution of government in August 2008, has delayed security sector reform. Given the tight timeframe of the mission this delay can threaten the success of the mission.

Central Africa

EU Support to African Union Mission in Darfur:

The international community has often been criticised for its weak response to the conflict in the Darfur region of western Sudan. Since February 2003, when the conflict started, the United Nations, the United States and the European Union have repeatedly condemned the atrocities but have failed to carry out any of their numerous threats to intervene. The African Union has played a more active role. In August 2004, it sent a 150-strong peacekeeping force to Darfur to monitor the ceasefire signed in April 2004. Yet, it soon became apparent that 150 troops would not be enough. On 18th July 2005 at the request of the African Union, the EU established a civilian-military action to support an enhanced African Union mission to Darfur. The mandate for the supporting action came to an end on 31st December 2007 when the African Union handed their peacekeeping mission over to a joint African Union and United Nations peacekeeping mission in Darfur (UNAMID).

The EU Support Operation made available equipment and assets, provided planning and technical assistance, deployed 100 troops and 50 policemen and contributed massively to the funding of the AU mission. This modest direct involvement – supporting an African Union mission instead of deploying an EU mission to Darfur – was justified by the EU as respect for the ‘African ownership’ principle.

Military Bridging Operation in eastern Chad and the north-east of the Central African Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA):

On 28th January 2008 the EU decided to step up its action to tackle the crisis in Darfur and launch EUFOR Tchad/RCA mission – a military operation in eastern Chad and the north-east of the Central African Republic. Chad and the Central African Republic (both countries bordering Sudan) are increasingly threatened by the Darfur conflict with huge numbers of Darfur refugees fleeing to the two countries. EUFOR Tchad/RCA has been mandated for 14 months – the intention being to give the UN sufficient time to assemble a follow-on force to take over the operation. Since the UN Security Council approved in January 2009 the deployment of a UN mission in the Central African Republic and Chad, the mission will end as planned on 15th March 2009.

EUFOR Tchad/RCA’s objectives have been threefold: to protect civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons, to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel and to contribute to protecting UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment.

EUFOR’s presence, regular patrolling and planned targeted operations have created a greater sense of security in the Central African Republic and Chad. The UN follow-on force can build on that. Nevertheless, the situation in Chad is still fragile since the attempt by rebel groups in February 2008 to overthrow Chadian President Idriss Déby Itno. Moreover given the deteriorating
relationship between Chad and Sudan, President Déby refused to allow the European force to be deployed on the border between Chad and Sudan. One of the mission’s intentions ‘to prevent the Darfur crisis from spilling over into the wider region’ proved therefore unattainable.

EU Military Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Operation Artemis):

The second Congo war, which was centred mainly in eastern Congo, lasted from August 1998 to July 2003 when an agreement to create a government of national unity was reached. On 6th May 2003, in accordance to an agreement between Congo and Uganda, Uganda withdrew their troops from Congo’s Ituri province. Yet immediately after the departure of the Ugandan troops, fighting between two major ethnic groups in Ituri, the Lendu and Hema, started. The UN Mission in Congo (MONUC), which was established in Congo in 2000, was not able to protect the citizens let alone pacify the Ituri province. The UN General Secretary Kofi Annan therefore appealed to the international community to provide an interim force that could stabilise Bunia, the capital of Ituri, until the UN sent a reinforced mission. France agreed to intervene – but only under an ESDP operation.

On 12th June 2003 the EU launched its military operation in Bunia, code-named Artemis. It was mandated until 1st September 2003 when the UN would deploy its reinforced mission. Artemis was widely regarded as a success. It demonstrated that the EU was able to react rapidly even at a distance of 6,500 km. The mission restored security in Bunia and helped displaced persons return to their homes. Critics charged that Artemis succeeded in demilitarising Bunia only by driving the militia elsewhere and not by disarming them or disbanding their units. According to them, the mission was too limited in time and space. Yet, Artemis was explicitly mandated only to demilitarise Bunia – and not the entire province of Ituri – and act as an interim force until the UN mission would be deployed. Furthermore by restoring peace to Bunia, the operation permitted the negotiations on the transitional government in Kinshasa to progress, thereby contributing to the overall peace process in Congo.

EU Police Mission in Kinshasa (EUPOL Kinshasa):

In order to help the Congolese police keep order during Congo’s transition to democracy, the EU decided to establish a police mission in Kinshasa, Congo’s capital. The EUPOL-Kinshasa Mission was officially launched on 12th April 2005 and lasted until 1st July 2007. The objective of the mission was to support the setting up of an integrated police unit (IPU), which as part of the national Congolese police should be responsible for protecting the personnel, institutions and infrastructure of the transitional government. In March 2006, following a UN request for assistance with the security of the general elections process in Congo, the EU member states agreed temporarily to enhance the EUPOL mission. For a period of five months (March – July 2006), covering the run up to the elections, the 29-strong mission was strengthened by 29 additional police personnel.

EUPOL KINSHASA was followed by EUPOL RD CONGO. The remit of the mission remained the same, but the operational area was expanded. In addition to Kinshasa, EUPOL RD CONGO covers the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo, where it takes particularly account of security issues, gender-based violence and international coordination. The mission is mandated to last until 30th June 2009.

EU Security Sector Reform Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC RD Congo):

On 8th June 2005, the EU launched an advisory and assistance mission for security reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC RD Congo), which is mandated until 30th June 2009. The mission supports the Congolese security authorities ‘by providing advice and assistance for the reform of their armed forces in order to ensure the security of the Congolese people and the possibility of national reconciliation and stability in the region’. Although small in size – only 8 experts seconded by the member states – the mission has taken on an increasingly important coordinating role in army reform. It has, for example, set up the Chain of Payment project, which separates the chain of command from the chain of financial management.

EU Military Operation (EUFOR RD Congo):

EUFOR RD Congo was an EU military mission set up to support the UN mission (MONUC) during Congo’s 2006 elections period. The operation was launched in June 2006 – one month before the general elections – and ended as planned in November 2006. It comprised 2,000 troops under the operational command of Germany, although only 800 troops were actually based in Congo. The other troops remained in neighbouring Gabon, only to be called up in the event of trouble. According to critics, EUFOR RD Congo has been the EU’s most disappointing mission. Not only were the troops based in Kinshasa, which had been pacified for some time, but the size of the force was too small to be effective. Given that Congo is a country three times the size of France, it is difficult to understand why a reserve force of 1,200 troops stayed behind in Gabon. The timeframe of the mission was also criticised. First, it took many months to get the mission off the ground. The UN request was made in December 2005, but it was not until March 2006 that the EU answered in the affirmative. Second, the mission ended when the troops were most needed – after the announcement of the result of the presidential election’s second round, which were only released at the beginning of November.

The EU in Africa: Summary:

France was the initiating power behind all the EU’s military operations in Africa
(EUFOR Tchad/RCA, Artemis and EUFOR RD Congo). EUFOR Tchad/RCA would not have been possible without France’s commitment to act as a lead nation and supply most of the 3,700 troops. Operation Artemis could only be deployed because of France’s readiness to provide the operational headquarters and troops. With EUFOR RD Congo, France was keen to initiate the mission but given other major involvements it did not have the capabilities to act as a lead nation. France, therefore, pressured Germany into leading the mission. Despite initial reluctance, Germany eventually agreed to become the lead nation but made sure to set a tight mission mandate and timeframe.

France’s interest in the deployment of these three missions to Africa was coloured both by the specific circumstances accompanying each mission and ythe country’s colonial past. France’s commitment for the launch of Artemis, for example, has to be understood in the light of the divisions among the EU member states over the Iraq war. France considered the Artemis Operation as a possibility to heal the rift in the EU. As it was the first autonomous EU military operation conducted without NATO assets Artemis could help the EU to institutionalise itself as an independent actor – an objective which has always been important for France. France’s colonial history is relevant in this context in a number of respects. In Chad, for instance, France already has 1,100 troops on the ground under a 1986 bilateral agreement to guarantee ‘territorial integrity’. Rebel groups accuse France of bringing diplomatic, strategic and logistical aid to the president, Idriss Déby Itno. Although the EU has been quick to stress EUFOR Tchad/RCA is impartial and follows a strict UN mandate, it is an awkward situation that two separate French forces are working in the same city under different mandates.

**Conclusion:**

Although one should not underestimate the scale and range of the EU missions, many of which have been put together with remarkable speed and efficiency, the EU has still not assumed a global role for interventions. The bulk of the operations have been in Europe, particularly in the Western Balkans. The missions the EU has carried out outside Europe, especially in the Middle East, have been of minor importance.

Some missions, for example Operation Proxima, experienced fierce battles over competence between the Head of the relevant Mission, the Special Representative and the European Commission Delegation. There was no effective co-ordination and division of labour between existing European development efforts and ESDP activities. The EU’s decision to replace the Head of the Commission Delegation and the Special Representative in Macedonia with one single figure allowed greater coherence between the Council and the Commission. However, more needs to be done in order to achieve maximum effectiveness of the EU effort in any crisis area. For example, close cooperation with existing European developmental and similar activities in the planning and implementation phases of ESDP missions will be an important element to ensure coherence between the Council and the Commission.

But it is not only the lack of co-ordination between the Council and Commission, which has caused problems for ESDP missions, but also the lack of co-ordination between ESDP military and civilian crisis management operations. In Bosnia, for example, military operation Althea clashed in many areas with the work of the police mission. Since then the EU has worked hard to improve the coherence of civilian and military instruments. In 2005, it set up a Civil–Military Cell within the EU Military Staff, which aims at enhancing the EUMs’ capacity to conduct early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning and at ensuring co-ordination between military and civilian crisis management tools. It can also be tasked to generate the capacity to plan and run an autonomous EU operation.

If one considers the EU’s most recent operations, such as the Aceh Monitoring Mission, which included civilian and military staff, or EUFOR RD Congo and EUPOL Kinshasa, which worked hand-in-hand to prevent an escalation during Congo’s general elections process, it becomes apparent that the EU has succeeded in improving civil-military co-ordination. In general, Javier Solana has pointed to an important reality in saying that the main added value of the EU’s crisis management is its use of both civilian and military instruments. Other international players, especially NATO, are ill-designed for such co-ordination.

**Notes**